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Is Man a Myth?
M ere Christian Perspectives on the Human
Donald T. W illiams
What a piece of work is a man."
Hamlet
"WHAT is Man,” the Psalmist asked his God, “that you are mindful of 
him?” It was a good question and is a pressing one. For nothing else 
can be properly decided until we know the answer. How else shall we know, to 
pick just one current and highly emotional question, when and whether it is a 
good thing to terminate the uterine development of members of the human 
species whose conception has proved inconvenient? And how, if they are allowed 
to be born and to live, can we best educate them or govern them unless we 
know what kind of thing they are, what their nature is, what purposes (if any) 
they are meant to serve (by whom?), what they are for? Never have we known 
more about their physical makeup, their psychology, and their history—yet 
never have we been less confident about the Answer which all that information 
is meant to inform. Which is certainly a precarious position for the race to find 
itself in.
The Question is obviously not an easy one. Whatever we may make of 
Alexander Pope’s answer, he certainly recognized the complexity of the subject:
Placed on this isthmus of a middle state,
A being darkly wise and rudely great:
W ith too much knowledge for the Skeptic side,
W ith too much weakness for the Stoic’s pride,
He hangs between; in doubt to act, or rest,
In doubt to deem himself a God, or Beast;
In doubt his M ind or Body to prefer,
Born but to die, and reas’ning but to err;
Alike in ignorance, his reason such,
Whether he thinks too little or too much:
Chaos of Thought and Passion all confused;
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Still by himself abused or disabused;
Created half to rise and half to fall;
Great lord of all things, yet a prey to all;
Sole judge of Truth, in endless Error hurled:
The glory, jest, and riddle of the world. (516)
Is Man, as a venerable definition has it, a featherless biped? That answer, 
while certainly accurate, is surely inadequate. Is he a beast, a god, or a demon— 
or, with the advent of the Couch Potato, should we add vegetable to the list of 
options? Is he the most erected simian that climbed up out of the primordial 
ooze or the least erected spirit that fell from Heaven? Is he a monkey with an 
opposable thumb or a marvel made in the image of God? According to the 
head Agent in that intriguing movie The Matrix, it is wrong even to classify 
him as a mammal, for mammals find an equilibrium with their environment. 
But Man multiplies heedlessly and uses up all the available resources, destroying 
the environment so that he has to expand to a new territory and repeat the 
process. Therefore, he should be classed with the only other species that lives 
in the same manner: the virus. Is he the measure o f all things or just a 
measurement, a number, a statistic? O r is he, in the words of Sir Thomas 
Browne, “that great and true amphibium, whose nature is disposed to live, not 
only like other creatures in divers elements, but in divided and distinguished 
worlds?” (339). And how do we find out?
There have been two main approaches to trying to answer the question. 
The first is represented by Pope:
Know then thyself, presume not God to scan;
The proper study of Mankind is Man. (516)
The second is that of Calvin:
Our wisdom, in so far as it ought to be deemed true and solid wisdom, consists 
almost entirely of two parts: the knowledge of God and of ourselves. But as these are 
connected together by many ties, it is not easy to determine which of the two precedes, 
and gives birth to the other. (37)
The first approach seems to manifest an admirable humility: Let’s stay 
away from abstract and exalted theories and just deal with what we know, 
human experience. Just the facts, Ma’am. But what if God is one of the facts?
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Though this approach does not necessarily exclude God from existence, it does 
exclude Him from relevance. And therefore, Pope’s method actually arrogantly 
begs the question and commits us to a purely secular description, of Man 
‘under the sun.’ And we know the conclusion the author of Ecclesiastes reached 
when he tried the experiment of looking at us that way: “’Vanity of vanities, all 
is vanity,’ saith the Preacher.”
The second approach seeks to understand Man as related, not just to the 
impersonal order of things, but to Someone behind it. If we are indeed, as one 
major tradition insists, created in the image o f God, then we cannot be 
understood at all except in that context. This method would carry its own kind 
of arrogance if indeed we thought we could presume to “scan” the infinite— 
unless, that is, the Divine had taken the initiative and revealed Itself to us, 
which is precisely what Christians claim has happened in Christ, the place 
where Calvin’s quests for knowledge of God and of Man come together.
How then ought we to proceed, since each path of inquiry seems already at 
the outset committed to a certain kind of answer? Perhaps the best procedure is 
to explore them both together, and then ask which one leads us to the place 
where we actually find ourselves. Because Man is the only object of study that 
we know from the inside as well as the outside, that is a question we just might 
be able to answer.
We are surrounded by profoundly trivial examples of what lies at the end 
of Pope’s path. If there is one God, Matter, and Science is its prophet, then we 
should expect to be completely satisfied by “material girls” who want to “just 
get physical,” by soulless yuppies who actually seem to believe that he who 
dies with the most toys wins. If people find such an approach to life deeply 
fillfilling, if when lying awake alone in bed at night they feel not the slightest 
urge to ask, “Is that all there is?”, then they have their answer, and I need 
trouble them no further. But if, though they hardly ever dare be vulnerable 
enough to admit it, there is something deep within that remains empty for all 
that Matter can do; if, when they do look at humanity long and hard and 
honesdy from the inside, they are forced to admit that the material and temporal 
can titillate and entertain, can distract life from pain for awhile but cannot 
justify its existence, then I would beg leave to suggest an Alternative.
One o f the most fertile minds o f the early Twentieth Century tried the 
experiment of looking at Man as an Animal, and discovered that there was no 
more fearful wildfowl than your human living, that to make this very attempt
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proves that we are spirits of a different sort. Two of the most fertile minds of the 
middle of the Century built on that work in rich and incisive ways. They were 
G. K. Chesterton, C. S. Lewis, and J. R. R. Tolkien. And now we may clamber 
on to the shoulders of those giants as we attem pt to peer into the new 
millennium. “Is Man a Myth?” we will ask. Perhaps not, we will discover; but 
there was a time when a Myth became a Man.
Chesterton and The Everlasting Man
If we take Popes secular path to understanding Man, we will of necessity 
view him as an animal; a chimpanzee with less hair, an opposable thumb, and 
a more flexible jaw, as it were. For the only viable destination which lies down 
Pope’s path for modern people is an evolutionary model. Man would be a 
simple extension of what is seen in the animal kingdom, produced by the same 
processes and adapted to the same ends. It was Chesterton’s contribution to 
take this idea more seriously than its proponents in order to see if it could 
really be made to work.
What Chesterton discovered in this experiment was that “It is exactly when 
we do regard man as an animal that we know he is not an animal” (xxii). His 
evidence for this conclusion is given in a series of impressionistic brush strokes 
that add up to a compelling portrait behind which is hidden a linear argument 
known as the reductio ad  absurdum. His brilliant mind darts about the intellectual 
landscape like a hummingbird. The flight may at times seem erratic, but he 
never forgets either what nectar he is seeking or where his nest is.
“George Wyndham once told me,” he notes, “that he had seen one of the 
first aeroplanes rise for the first time and it was very wonderful; but not so 
wonderful as a horse allowing a man to ride on him” (xviii). What is so wonderful 
about this? Rhinoceri allow tickbirds, sharks remora to ride on them. But the 
very analogies self destruct as defenses of the evolutionary approach. For these 
other symbiotic relationships are instinctual, and the relationship between 
man and horse anything but. Rhinoceri are not directed by tickbirds whither 
they shall go by bit and bridle and the pressure of knees. Wherever the two 
species are found, moreover, the birds are found upon the backs. But it did not 
occur to all men at all times that horses could be persuaded to bear them, nor 
have all horses at all times been so persuaded. And while the word “persuaded” 
is no doubt a metaphor, it is a singularly apt metaphor. Even where men and 
horses have been performing this exotic behavior together for centuries, it does
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not “come naturally” to either species but has to be learned by both. When the 
first man thought of the idea, it was not a linear evolutionary projection from 
anything Nature had done before but an outlandish notion that was probably 
laughed to scorn until he actually pulled it off. And while our species has a 
long history of coming up with such outlandish notions that for good or evil 
veer straight off into space from anything that evolution could project, nobody 
will seriously argue that the horse was the one first to propose riding in exchange 
for warm stalls, currycombs, and oats. Why not?
Chesterton does not stop to elucidate his observation as I have done; he is 
off to look at another flower. But there is one kind of blossom he keeps circling 
back to:
It is the simple truth that man does differ from the brutes in kind and not in degree; and the 
proof of it is here; that it sounds like a truism to say that the most primitive man drew a picture 
of a monkey and that it sounds like a joke to say that the most intelligent monkey drew a picture 
of a man. Something o f division and disproportion has appeared; and it is unique. Art is the 
signature o f man. (16)
The most primitive forms of humanity that we have uncovered manifest 
this amazing trait: “After all, it would come back to this; that he had dug very 
deep and found the place where a man had drawn the picture of a reindeer. But 
he would dig a good deal deeper before he found a place where a reindeer had 
drawn a picture of a man” (15).
Once again, analysis only deepens and widens the chasm between us and 
the other species. Monkeys may sharpen sticks to make primitive tools for 
digging termites out of the ground; they may arrange boxes into a pile they can 
climb to retrieve a banana hung from the ceiling. They do not arrange the 
sticks or the boxes into intricate patterns simply so they can sit back and lose 
themselves in the contemplation of their symmetry. O ther species, in other 
words, pursue the practical arts on a rudimentary level, but know nothing of 
what we call the fine arts. And this impulse to “fine” (or what me might better 
call “unnecessary”) art in the human species extends itself to touch all the 
practical arts as well— in fact, may be most impressive there:
The very fact that a bird can get as far as building a nest, and cannot get any farther, proves that 
he has not a mind as man has a mind; it proves it more completely than if  he built nothing at 
all. I f  he built nothing at all, he m ight possibly be a philosopher o f the Quietist or Buddhist 
school, indifferent to all but the m ind within. But when he builds as he does build and is
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satisfied and sings aloud with satisfaction, then we know there is really an invisible veil like a 
pane of glass between him and us, like the window on which a bird will beat in vain. But 
suppose our abstract onlooker saw one o f the birds begin to build as men build. Suppose in an 
incredibly short space of time there were seven styles of architecture for one style o f nest. 
Suppose the bird carefully selected forked twigs and pointed leaves to express the piercing 
piety of Gothic, but turned to broad foliage and black mud when he sought in a darker mood 
to call up the heavy columns of Bel and Ashtaroth; making his nest indeed one o f the hanging 
gardens of Babylon. Suppose the bird made little clay statues o f birds celebrated in letters or 
politics and stuck them up in front o f the nest. Suppose that one bird out of a thousand birds 
began to do one of the thousand things that man had already done even in the morning o f the 
world; and we can be quite certain that the onlooker would not regard such a bird as a mere 
evolutionary variety o f the other birds; he would regard it is a very fearful wild-fowl indeed. 
(21- 22)
Analogies to human arts in the animal kingdom, in other words, serve only to 
reinforce the conclusion that we are looking across a vast chasm which evolution 
alone could not bridge, and in fact has not bridged. Birds do not gather to 
listen to the songs of other birds for pleasure or fulfillment, nor do they sing to 
express sorrow or joy, but rather to tell the other birds to stay the heck out of 
their territory. What we call birdsong is song only after it has been filtered 
through a human mind. Art is the signature of man because it constitutes a 
radical break with animal behavior, not a development from it:
[T]here is in fact not a trace of any such development or degree. Monkeys did not begin 
pictures and men finish them; Pithecanthropus did not draw a reindeer badly and Homo 
Sapiens draw it well. The higher animals did not draw better and better portraits; the dog did 
not paint better in his best period than in his early bad manner as a jackal; the wild horse was 
not an Impressionist and the race-horse a Post-Impressionist. (17)
The arts, in other words, show that man is not merely adaptive, like the 
animals, but more than that—he is creative: “This creature was truly different 
from all other creatures; because he was a creator as well as a creature” (18). He 
is not merely responsive to his environment; he initiates new things not dreamt 
of in Natures philosophy. He is able to do this because he acts not from instinct 
but from understanding; he has an irresistible urge to try to see things in terms 
of principles. He has therefore, in a sense not shared by the other animals, a 
mind. And there is something in that fact that is more than natural, if philosophy 
could find it out. For on naturalistic principles, it is a thing that ought not to 
be.
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[N]o philosopher denies that a mystery soil attaches to the two great transitions: the origin of 
the universe itself and the origin o f  the principle o f life itself. M ost philosophers have the 
enlightenment to add that a third mystery attaches to the origin o f man himself. In other 
words, a third bridge was built across a third abyss of the unthinkable when there came into the 
world what we call reason and what we call will. Man is not merely an evolution but rather a 
revolution. (6)
We know that evolution is, at most, less than the whole truth because the 
mind of man is something it could not have produced. The assumption that it 
could results from mere inattention to the reality of who we are as developed 
above, driven perhaps by reductionist philosophies that focus only on the 
physical:
There may be a broken trail of stones and bones faintly suggesting the development o f the 
human body. There is nothing even faintly suggesting such a development o f this human 
mind. It was not and it was; we know not in what instant or in what infinity o f years. 
Something happened; and it has all the appearance o f a transaction outside time. (22)
One either allows for a transaction from outside of time, or one is left with 
a secularist reductionism. Various forms o f such reductionism— economic, 
psychological, sexual— have naturally been the dom inant paradigms for 
processing human experience in our secular age. And they are all ultimately 
dehumanizing, leaving out of the story much of what makes it worth telling: 
“Cows may be purely economic, in the sense that we cannot see that they do 
much beyond grazing and seeking better grazing grounds; and that is why a 
history of cows in twelve volumes would not be very lively reading” (158). 
Why is the story of humanity, appalling though it often is, very lively reading 
indeed? Because secularism is reductionism, and man, even secular man, will 
not be so reduced:
[T] he story only begins where the motive of the cows and sheep leaves off. It will be hard to 
maintain that the Crusaders went from their homes into a howling wilderness because cows go 
from a wilderness to a more comfortable grazing-ground. It will be hard to maintain that the 
Arctic explorers went north with the same material motive that made the swallows go south. 
And if you leave things like all the religious wars and all the merely adventurous explorations 
out o f the human story, it will not only cease to be hum an at all but cease to be a story at all. 
(159)
We know of course where Chesterton is going: the only explanation of 
humanity that actually explains it is the one that says we are adventurous
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because we are a venture; that we are creative and mindful because we were 
created in the image of the Creator who is still, as the Psalmist marvels, mindful 
of us. Ultimately nothing less than full Christian orthodoxy allows man to be 
fully human. Western secular philosophies reduce him to an animal, and eastern 
religious ones to nothingness: “I maintain that when brought out into the 
daylight these two things look altogether strange and unique. . . . The first of 
these is the creature called man and the second is the man called Christ” (xvii). 
They look strange, that is, when we come to them with either secular or 
pantheistic presuppositions, yet without letting those assumptions blind us to 
the full reality of what they are. This of course is difficult to do while we are 
still in the grip of those stifling ideologies. It needs a thinker who has already 
outgrown them to show us the way. It is Chesterton’s ability to do just that 
which makes him so valuable.
We need not follow here all the details of how our darting hummingbird 
zeroes in on Bible and Creed as the foundations of anthropology. It has much 
to do with the plentiful lack of plot in the history of cows in twelve volumes, 
together with the fact that the Bible gives us the plot that makes sense of us, 
hence providing a foundation for what Chesterton calls “the philosophy of 
stories” (307). Once the plausibility of naturalism has been exploded, the rest 
of the path is fairly plain. And once he has opened our eyes to it, his conclusion 
strikes with inevitable force: “It is not natural to see man as a natural product” 
(20). Man is the only one of the physical creatures with enough of a self to 
want to sign his name; art is his signature; and he gets both from the greatest 
Artist of all.
C. S. Lewis and The Abolition o f Man
Chesterton, by taking the secular approach more seriously than the 
secularists, made it collapse into absurdity. But not everyone was serious enough 
to laugh with him. Another generation passed, the effects of reductionism 
proceeded apace, and by mid-century the farsighted had begun to wonder 
whether our insistence on seeing man as merely an animal might become so 
addictive that we would lose the ability to function as more. If the human 
dijferentia came, as Chesterton argued, from God, they could hardly be abolished. 
But still, we could try, and in trying do a great deal of damage. So we move, in 
an ironic procession of tides, from Chesterton’s The Everlasting Man to Lewis’s 
The Abolition o f Man, a book in which he charts the form those reductionistic 
efforts were taking by mid century.
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Changes in our view of human nature inevitably show up in educational 
theory and practice, even if they are not articulated there as such. So Lewis 
begins by being concerned about language he finds in a book for teaching 
English to schoolchildren. He charitably disguises the authors as Gaius and 
Titius, and refers to their volume as “The Green Book”: “Gaius and Titius 
comment as follows: ‘When that man said That is sublime, he appeared to be 
making the remark about the waterfall. . . . Actually . . .  he was not making a 
remark about the waterfall, but a remark about his own feelings’” (14). In this 
seemingly innocent observation, Lewis smells nothing less than the Giant Rat 
of Sumatra: “The schoolboy who reads this passage in The Green Book will 
believe two propositions: firstly, that all sentences containing a predicate of 
value are statements about the emotional state of the speakers, and, secondly, 
that all such statements are unimportant” (15).
What happens when we switch from statements about the aesthetic beauty 
of waterfalls to statements about moral values— or about the value of human 
life? If naturalism is true, then only the physically quantifiable is real. So if we 
are taught to treat only the physically quantifiable as real, then we have created 
a presumption that naturalism is true. And that presumption digs a chasm 
between us and the whole history of human experience and understanding: 
“Until quite modern times all teachers and even all men believed the universe 
to be such that certain emotional reactions on our part could be either congruous 
or incongruous to it— believed, in fact, that objects did not merely receive, but 
could merit, our approval or disapproval, our reverence, or our contempt” (25). 
They felt that way because, having not yet accepted the premise that only the 
physically quantifiable is real, they were free to believe in the reality of other 
than numerical values. Lewis calls this traditional approach to life “the doctrine 
of objective value,” and the hierarchy of values perceived in the universe in the 
light of it the Tao:
It is the doctrine o f objective value, the belief that certain attitudes are really true, and others 
really false, to the kind of thing the universe is and the kind of things we are. Those who know 
the Tao can hold that to call children delightful or old men venerable is not simply to record a 
psychological fact about our own parental or filial emotions at the moment, but to recognize a 
quality which demands a certain response from us whether we make it or not. (29)
The humanity of the human species, those qualities that according to 
Chesterton separate us from the merely animal, depends on the existence of
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this objective but not physical Tao and our ability to perceive it. If only the 
physically quantifiable is real, then the evolutionary model is adequate and 
Man’s uniqueness an illusion. But if naturalism is false—if we are creative minds 
because we were created by the ultimate Mind— then values are not merely 
subjective. The valuations made by the Creator Himself have the same reality 
as the physical objects He made and which He values, and discovering those 
values is the path to fulfillment for humans who want their lives to have value 
as well. If this is true, then Milton’s Satan— and the hordes of modern and 
post-modern thinkers who follow him—are wrong when they claim that “The 
mind is its own place, and in it self / Can make a Heav'n of Hell, a Hell of 
Heav'n” (Paradise Lost 1.254-55). In other words, there is the potential for a 
rational, not merely an instinctual, grounding for what humans value and how 
they feel about it:
[Bjecause our approvals and disapprovals are thus recognitions of objective value or responses 
to an objective order, therefore emotional states can be in harmony with reason (when we feel 
liking for what ought to be approved) or out o f harmony with reason (when we perceive that 
liking is due but cannot feel it). (Abolition 29)
Lewis does not at this point specify the Christian theistic grounding of the 
Too—he saves that task, in effect, for Mere Christianity and Miracles, being here 
content to appeal to the universal perception of the Tao in pre-Modern times 
that he documents in the appendix. What he zeroes in on is the fact that 
modern secularist reductionism, by defining the Tao out of existence and 
insisting that nothing but the physically quantifiable can be real or objective, 
also rules out of court precisely the central essence of human nature.
The peculiarity of that nature is that humanity is indeed located precisely 
on Pope’s “isthmus of a middle state.” This much he had retained of the Tradition. 
We are that being that, like the animals, has a physical body influenced by 
instinct, but, like the angels, has a spiritual nature capable of perceiving the 
Tao. The reality of our animal nature provides plenty of evidence for those who 
would reduce us to that nature alone, but the uniqueness of our position in 
creation is that, as far as we know, we are the only creature that has to deal with 
the sometimes difficult integration of that animal nature with the spiritual. 
Lewis recognized this aspect of our situation and stressed its importance for 
how we conceive the process of education, specifically the danger of ignoring 
it:
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We were told it all long ago by Plato. As the king governs by his executive, so Reason in man 
must rule the mere appetites by means of the ‘spirited element.’ The head rules the belly 
through the chest— the seat, as Alanus tells us, o f Magnanimity, of emotions organized by 
trained habit into stable sentiments. The Chest— Magnanimity— Sentiment— these are the 
indispensable liaison officers between cerebral man and visceral man. It may even be said that 
it is by this middle element that man is man: for by his intellect he is mere spirit and by his 
appetite mere animal. The operation of The Green Book and its kind is to produce what may be 
called Men without Chests. (34)
The Tao perceived by the mind, in other words, is not automatically followed 
by the body. That is what it means to have a mind rather than operating by 
mere instinct. So part of the role of education is to foster well-ordered emotions, 
“sentiments” that aid the mind in governing the body according to the Tao. It 
is, in other words, to transmit to the next generation the developed ways of 
feeling about things that have been discovered by the bitter experience of many 
previous generations to be in accordance with reason and the Tao— to transmit 
civilization. If we insist that thoughts about values are really only feelings, and 
then debunk feelings about values as baseless because the values cannot be 
stuck into either a test-tube or a calculator, we foster barbarism instead. And as 
human beings, neither animal nor angel, we need both the thoughts and the 
feelings:
W ithout the aid of trained emotions the intellect is powerless against the animal organism. I 
had sooner play cards against a man who was quite sceptical about ethics, but bred to believe 
that ‘a gentleman does not cheat,’ than against an irreproachable moral philosopher who had 
been brought up among sharpers. (33-34)
Education in the spirit of The Green Book—in the spirit of reductionist 
materialism— trains something that is less than human. Because of the way it 
denies or devalues the mind, it leaves out entirely the middle element, seeing 
no necessity to integrate something that transcends the physical with a physical 
nature conceived as the whole person. (Attempts to deal with teenage pregnancy 
through that oxymoronic method of “values-free” sex education come to mind.) 
As Lewis describes it, “In a sort of ghastly simplicity we remove the organ and 
demand the function. We make men without chests and expect of them virtue 
and enterprise. We laugh at honour and are shocked to find traitors in our 
midst. We castrate and bid the geldings be fruitful” (35). It is then impossible
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to underestimate what is at stake in these rival conceptions of human nature: 
“The practical result of education in the spirit of The Green Book must be the 
destruction of the society which accepts it” (39).
We cannot make human beings less than human, but by training them to 
think of themselves as less than human we can get them to act as less, with 
disastrous consequences. Therefore, Lewis speaks with hyperbole perhaps but 
nevertheless makes a valid point when he says of those who operate on the basis 
of materialist reductionism that, “It is not that they are bad men. They are not 
men at all. Stepping outside the Tao, they have stepped into the void” (77). 
They have tried with mixed success to give up something that is essential to 
full humanity, at least. The two rival conceptions of humanity stare at each 
other across a great chasm, and what is at stake is the very possibility of a 
civilization in which man can be whole, develop to his potential:
Either we are rational spirit obliged for ever to obey the absolute values of the Tao, or else we are 
mere nature to be kneaded and cut into new shapes for the pleasures o f masters who must, by 
hypothesis, have no motive but their own ‘natural’ impulses. Only the Tao provides a common 
human law of action which can overarch rulers and ruled alike. A dogmatic belief in objective 
value is necessary to the very idea of a rule which is not tyranny or an obedience which is not 
slavery. (84-85)
In summary, to be human is to be an animal who is aware of spiritual 
values. Though reductionists deny the existence of such creatures, implying 
that Man in that sense is in fact a myth, they themselves cannot escape the Tao. 
For they think that we ought to reject traditional values as an impediment to 
human progress; but if they are right, the word ought is meaningless. In a 
materialist world, no manipulation of any of the ciphers properly admitted to 
that world could ever possibly produce such a concept:
If he had really started from scratch, from right outside the human tradition of value, no 
jugglery could have advanced him an inch towards the conception that a man should die for 
the community or work for posterity. If the Tao falls, all his own conceptions of value fall with 
it. Not one of them can claim any authority other than that of the Tao. Only by such shreds of 
the Tao as he has inherited is he enabled even to attack it. (54)
Or, in other words,
[The Tao] is not one among a series of possible systems of value. It is the sole source of all value 
judgements. If it is rejected, all value is rejected. If any value is retained, it is retained. The effort
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to refute it and raise a new system of value in its place is self-contradictory. There never has 
been, and never will be, a radically new judgement of value in the history of the world. W hat 
purport to be new systems or (as they now call them) ‘ideologies,’ all consist of fragments from 
the Tao itself, arbitrarily wrenched from their context in the whole and then swollen to madness 
in their isolation, yet still owing to the Tao and to it alone such validity as they possess. (56)
Lewis illustrates this point in Out o f the Silent Planet, when Oyarsa, the 
governing spirit of Malacandra, diagnoses Weston’s “bentness” as proceeding 
from the fact that there are laws known to all hnau (the Old Solar word for 
sentient animal), including pity, straight dealing, and love of kindred. But 
Weston has taken the love of kindred, a true law in itself, out of its context in 
the Tao, and made it into “a little, blind Oyarsa in your brain” (138). As a 
result, he breaks all the other laws and does not even truly keep that one, for he 
is willing to sacrifice any individual human being for what he considers the 
abstract good of the race. Even Weston can be evil, not by creating new values 
apart from the Tao, but only by truncating and twisting the ones it gives us. 
Thus Satan’s program of creating his own values in the mind’s own place 
inevitably fails even in its greatest success: in spite of itself, it is forced to give 
ironic witness to the reality and validity of the Tao.
If the Tao is indeed an inescapable reality, then the conception of human 
nature it calls for is upheld: “In the Tao itself, as long as we remain within it, 
we find the concrete reality in which to participate is to be truly human” 
(.Abolition 86). To deny this is indeed to attempt to abolish humanity itself.
J. R. R. Tolkien: Hum anity and Faerie
Lewis’s friend J. R. R. Tolkien fought the abolition of Man not only by 
writing a very unbovine history of Middle-earth, but also by thinking profoundly 
about the nature and significance of certain kinds of stories that our strange 
species keeps coming back to. His essay “On Fairy-Stories” is full of insight not 
only into the stories themselves, but also their makers. He finds them as creative 
as Chesterton did and participating in a very Lewisian Tao\ for they are compelled 
to make stories full of magic and marvels, stories in which Good confronts Evil 
and in which “keeping promises (even those with intolerable consequences)” 
forms “one of the notes of the horns of Elfland, and not a dim note” (67). But 
Tolkien goes on to be more explicit about where these myth-making qualities 
in our race come from, answering a friend who had questioned the value of 
myth for “enlightened” moderns:
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“Dear Sir, ”I said—“Although now long estranged,
Man is not wholly lost nor wholly changed.
Dis-graced he may be, yetis not de-throned. 
and keeps the rags of lordship once he owned:
Man, Sub-creator, the refracted Light 
through whom is splintered from a single White 
to many hues, and endlessly combined 
in living shapes that move from mind to mind.
Though all the crannies of the world we filled 
with Elves and Goblins, though we dared to build 
Gods and their houses out of dark and light, 
and sowed the seed of dragons—  'twos our right 
(used or misused). That right has not decayed: 
we make still by the law in which we’re made. ”(54)
“We make still by the law in which we’re made.” Man, in other words, is 
inexplicable by materialist reductionism because of the Imago Dei-, we love to 
tell and hear stories because we are made in the image of the Creator whose 
creation is in fact the Story we call History and Redemption. Or, in terms 
more in keeping with Tolkien’s defense of Faerie, the human race is incapable of 
being hilly explained or portrayed by either philosophical or literary naturalism. 
We are also irrepressible inventors and expressers of ourselves because we are 
made in the image of the Creator. But Tolkien focuses on stories. Every writer, 
like God, creates a world, determines the laws of its nature, and peoples it with 
characters whose significant actions give that world its meaning. God’s “primary 
world” is reflected in our “secondary worlds,” which, far from being mere escape 
or wish fulfillment, reflect back into the primary world the marvelous quality— 
the “enchantment”— that is really there by virtue of its created, its non­
reductionist character, but which familiarity and secularist philosophy work to 
obscure.
One feature of the Faerie Story which is central to Tolkien’s literary apologetic 
is the Happy Ending. It is, he concludes, essential to the form. But it is not 
just the fact that things turn out well: “It is a sudden and miraculous grace . . . 
It does not deny the existence o f . . . sorrow and failure: the possibility of these 
is necessary to the joy of deliverance” (68). That is why, when the “turn” comes, 
there is “a catch of the breath, a beat and lifting of the hear t . . .  as keen as that 
given by any form of literary art” (69). To this moment he gives the technical 
name eucatastrophe.
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Tolkien suggests that this moment of eucatastrophe in a well-constructed 
story moves us so because it carries a glimpse of deeper realities about who we 
are— about our own story, as it were. And just as he made explicit what 
Chesterton had been hinting at when he appealed to role of the imago Dei in 
our making or beginning, so here he is not reticent about spelling out the 
theological meaning of the climax of our larger story either:
God redeemed the corrupt making-creatures, men, in a way fitting to this aspect, as to others, 
of their strange nature. The Gospels contain a fairy-story, or a story of a larger kind which 
embraces the essence of fairy-stories... [A]mong the marvels is the greatest and most complete 
conceivable eucatastrophe. But this story has entered History and the primary world. (71)
The incarnation, sacrifice, and resurrection of Christ not only complete 
and fulfill Old-Testament prophecy, they complete and fulfill the plots of all 
the great myths and fairy stories of the human race. All the hints in our literature 
that we are more than mere collocations of atoms coalesce into a coherent 
explanation of who and what we are when we see that this eucatastrophe is 
indeed the Happy Ending we were made for. We make because we were made 
in the image of the Maker. What we make is sometimes corrupted because we 
fell from His grace. But the stories we make still speak of our longing for 
restoration, because we were made in the image of the Maker who is Savior and 
Redeemer as well. And Christ is what we have always been looking for. He is 
the ultimate definition of true humanity. So the one vantage point from which 
our whole strange and unbovine history makes sense is also the one place where 
Myth and History are one: the spot where, in the light of the rising sun, the 
shadow of a Cross points to the open door of an Empty Tomb.
Conclusion
Chesterton had found two things inexplicable on a materialistic basis: the 
creature called Man and the man called Christ, neither of which would consent 
to being reduced to mere nature. Lewis explicated the ethical implications of 
our irreducibility in the non-material Tao, rebellion against which in the name 
of reductionist philosophies threatens our very humanity. Tolkien brings us 
full circle, explaining why story telling is central to this irreducible human 
nature, and finding the fulfillment of our most moving stories in the story of 
Christ, that point where, as Lewis would put it, myth entered history.
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So the human race still hangs on. In spite of every attempt to define it out 
of existence, it keeps building its very unbirdlike nests and writing its very 
unbovine histories. Perhaps if we could read the faun’s-eye view of our race that 
Lucy saw in Mr. Tumnus’s library, we should find the answer to its titular 
question laden with Chestertonian irony. Is Man a Myth? It depends on what 
we mean. Man, the spiritual animal whose mind transcends the physically 
quantifiable in ways that are of mythic proportions, is not a myth (in the sense 
that he does not exist), though he is both mythopoeic and mythopathic. But Man 
the product of evolution who can be explained fully in terms of material and 
mechanical processes is definitely a myth, a myth created by M an the 
Mythmaker. For this Man is a story that attempts to explain the world, and 
explains it well as long as we do not step outside the limited vision of reductionist 
materialism. But there are older myths, more redolent of the full truth about 
us if not more powerful to shape our conceptions. And one of those, if these 
men were right, is the True Myth, the one story that really does explain the 
world.
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